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Abstract 
Colleen Murphy’s book, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, is a formidable accomplishment. Its 
detailed grasp and fluid synthesis of a daunting body of theoretical and empirical work on transitional justice, 
and Murphy’s command of philosophical tools -- from political philosophy, philosophy of law, and ethics – is 
masterful. It stands alone as a philosophical work that sets out to demonstrate how transitional justice – a body 
of theory, practice, and advocacy – is about justice and unfolds what can only be called a grand unified theory of 
a single, novel, distinct kind of justice that is transitional justice (compare Teitel, Winter, Philpott, Verdeja). 
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Murphy’s interest is “the moral evaluation of the choices that transitional communities make in dealing with 
wrongdoing” (2). She argues that transitional justice does not reduce to retributive, corrective, or distributive 
justice, nor the somewhat new-fangled idea of restorative justice (83). Transitional justice is instead a distinct 
kind of justice that is defined by the peculiar circumstances in which it becomes salient and by a specific 
problem that those circumstances pose. The circumstances are: pervasive structural inequality; normalized 
collective and political wrongdoing; serious existential uncertainty; and fundamental uncertainty about 
authority (33). These circumstances are distinct, Murphy holds (not uncontroversially), from circumstances of 
“stable democratic contexts,” in which structural inequality is limited, wrongdoing is individual and deviant, 
existential uncertainty is minor, and uncertainty about authority is narrow (34). These particular conditions 
define a “central moral challenge” for transitional justice: What constitutes a just societal transformation? (33-
34). 
Murphy’s position is that the “overarching aim for the sake of which processes of transitional justice are 
adopted” is “societal transformation” in a very demanding sense. Societal transformation requires “overhauling 
the terms of interaction structuring political relationships among citizens and between citizens and officials” to 
establish relationships of “mutual respect for agency and reciprocity” (160). The job of transitional justice, 
however, is to pursue this robust relational transformation “by dealing with past wrongs” through “intrinsically 
fitting or appropriate responses to victims and perpetrators of wrongdoing” (195). In her conclusion, she recaps: 
“Transitional justice responses can fail to be just in two senses: by failing to contribute to societal 
transformation or by failing to be appropriate and fitting responses to victims and/or perpetrators. 
There is reason to believe that processes can satisfy both sets of criteria if pursued with both sets in 
mind and if transitional justice processes are designed and implemented in a coordinated manner” 
(195). 
 
If you want to know why the circumstances to which transitional justice responds trouble familiar 
understandings of retributive or corrective justice or want a quick but exquisite tutorial in why certain responses 
to victims and perpetrators in the aftermath of systemic violence matter, read this book. I will focus on three big 
questions. First, how do we know that transitional justice is fundamentally a single special kind of justice that 
permits a grand unified theory? Second, is it plausible to hold, as Murphy claims, that societal transformation is 
the overarching aim of transitional justice? Third, is transitional justice convincingly explained as pursuing 
societal transformation “through” (112) or “via” (194) or “by” (195) dealing with past wrongdoing? 
How Do We Know What Transitional Justice ‘Is’? 
A recent overview of article literature in the field finds that transitional justice is “still struggling for a consistent 
definition that reflects a worldwide consensus” (Fletcher and Weinstein 2015, 192-193). An undertheorized area 
of practice and discourse in need of a deeply informed theoretical structure to unify and guide it – this looks like 
great news for Murphy’s contribution; or is it? 
Murphy’s book begins with a series of ground-clearing arguments that other ways of explaining the justice in 
transitional justice fail. Transitional justice is not justice compromised with expediency; nor is it justice 
compromised by competing moral demands, such as peace or reconciliation; nor is it restorative justice. What 
she does not discuss is a prior question about whether there is reason to think that transitional justice admits of 
a non-trivial, unified construal, or whether the unifying feature of transitional justice, if there is one, is indeed 
justice. Yet this is a live question in the field, fought over both directly and often implicitly across its disciplinary 
tributaries. 
Everyone agrees that transitional justice describes a set of practices and allied thinking that began to emerge in 
the 1990s in response to transitions from repressive military regimes in Latin America and communist 
dictatorships in Eastern Europe. Transitional justice is about “dealing with the past,” where the past involves 
large-scale or systematically patterned grave human rights or humanitarian abuses from which a society has 
emerged or is trying to emerge (Bell 2009, 7). The practical repertory of transitional measures (often – and 
sometimes derisively – called the “tool kit”) has also remained strikingly constant (although not without 
dissension, to which I return below). Criminal trials, truth recovery projects, reparations, and reforms of relevant 
institutions, constitute the enduring standard menu. Beyond this point there are fateful divergences. 
An influential definition of transitional justice, enshrined by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004, is 
“the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy 
of large-scale past abuses, in order to assure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (UN 
Security Council 2004). This definition already folds in a broader concern with reconciliation, although the 
relationship of accountability to reconciliation is arguable (Seils 2017, 2-4). Similarly, for the way Fletcher and 
Weinstein gloss transitional justice as “a menu of interventions to promote justice, political stability, and human 
rights (variously defined)” (Fletcher and Weinstein 2017, 193). The International Center for Transitional Justice 
continues to foreground “accountability and redress for victims” on its website 
(https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice). Roger Duthie, introducing a recent collection published by 
ICTJ, says that “The protection and vindication of victims’ rights is the most direct objective of transitional justice 
processes and should not be subsumed under other policy objectives” (Duthie, 2017, 10). There is a contest here 
between transitional justice as (just) justice, as justice “plus” other desired goals, and as justice “in order to” get 
to something else. 
There are other contests as well. In perhaps the most attended quantitative study of whether and how 
transitional justice “works,” Olsen, Payne, and Reiter’s Transitional Justice in Balance, the authors define 
transitional justice as “the array of processes designed to address past human rights violations following periods 
of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict” (11). They include amnesty in their empirical study of the 
efficacy of transitional justice measures (Olsen et. al. 2010, 1). But amnesty is not a justice measure; amnesties 
are justified instrumentally in the best case for their contribution to peace, stability, or reconciliation. But 
amnesty (usually blanket amnesty) is the most widely used device in the aftermath of conflict or repression. 
Olsen et. al., in looking for “what works,” effectively promote a kind of transitional justice nominalism. 
Transitional justice on this view is what international lawyer Christine Bell characterizes as “a label to describe a 
range of particularistic bargains aimed at increasing democratization and reducing violence” (Bell 13). 
Now, I am sure Murphy is aware of this backdrop; some of the works I’ve referred to are cited and quoted by 
Murphy in her book. She does not discuss the question of whether transitional justice is “merely an ad hoc 
practical concatenation” of measures (Winter 2015, 215), but goes straight to the justice question in pursuit of 
an inclusive and distinct theory. I think there is a reason, however, for Murphy to address the contest 
surrounding the very nature of the field. In a book on the “conceptual foundations” of transitional justice, it’s 
fair to ask whether we think it has conceptual foundations, where we should look for them, and what counts in 
showing we have uncovered them. This in turn raises an important question about how Murphy sees her project 
and about how we are intended to evaluate it. Is it a rational reconstruction of an area of practice whose 
supporting rationales are mixed or unclear? Is it instead a radically revisionary critical account of what we should 
consider to be the unique demands of justice in transition, perhaps at variance with significant parts of existing 
literature and common practice? Or is it a constructivist theoretical experiment that is unconcerned with its 
good or ill fit with the confusing (and perhaps conceptually unsound or infirm) “field” of transitional justice? 
In the Introduction, Murphy says she will “generate” a set of normative principles to apply in a kind of 
circumstance by identifying what facts give rise to the problem, as if de novo (Murphy 37). This sounds like an 
experiment in free-standing theoretical construction. But Murphy clearly means to fully engage the existing 
conversation, with her careful attention to extant theory and practice, her reference to the “practical need” for 
normative theory (20), and her address not only to theorists but also “policy makers and citizens” (6). In the 
Conclusion of the book, Murphy explains that she did not discuss particular transitional measures in detail, lest 
she reinforce the idea that the “standard menu” of measures constitutes “the complete range of options from 
which transitional societies should choose,” while the range of responses is “potentially much broader” (200). 
This seems to imply a rational reconstruction approach that claims both to make good sense of existing practice 
and thinking and to extend the power and reach of the approach. Because Murphy doesn’t challenge the 
existing repertory, but speaks of its extension, it does not appear that her aim is radically revisionary critique. 
Her view that transitional justice is for the sake of societal transformation, however, is radically revisionary. Her 
view sorts with a growing segment of transitional justice literature that argues for “transformative transitional 
justice.” 
Is Societal Transformation the Goal of Transitional Justice? 
Murphy’s book from start to finish is in service of her central theoretical claim: “Transitional justice is ultimately 
concerned with the just pursuit of societal transformation…” (7). I am surprised, then, not to find much in the 
way of an argument for that claim. 
Some passages, however briefly, hint at a “root causes” argument that is common in the wider transformational 
literature. Murphy says that societal transformation and responding to wrongs “get linked” in the special 
circumstances of transition (112). Pervasive structural inequality “enabled” (27) normalized wrongdoing, just as 
such wrongdoing shores up pervasive inequality, Murphy says (113). This looks like the argument that 
transitional justice is not really or effectively “dealing with the past” if it leaves in place systemic patterns of 
social and political disempowerment and vulnerability to violence (such as those based on gender, poverty, 
ethnicity, indigeneity, or religious marginalization). Transitional justice must not rest content with addressing 
the aftermath but must also attend to the disposing or enabling conditions of violence and repression. 
Although I suspect this is part of what she intends, in this same passage Murphy stresses instead of a different 
“link”: in conditions of existential uncertainty that characterize transitional settings, dealing or failing to deal 
with structural issues has “enormous implications” that can influence the society’s trajectory and the success of 
its transition; failing to address the linked phenomena of structural inequality and normalized violence also has 
implications for political authority in the characteristic transitional condition of uncertainty about state authority 
(113). This argument seems to be that in the face of the circumstances of structural inequality and normalized 
violence, transitional justice must either attempt societal transformation or it will fail to address the other two 
conditions of existential uncertainty and uncertain authority (see also 194). These claims, notice, are empirical 
claims about what phenomena are predictably linked causally in transitions. These connections do not go 
without saying and cannot be established solely by argument. So, I don’t see a clear argument, or even a nod to 
the empirical basis and complexity of causal claims that are made, in support of societal transformation as the 
guiding aim of transitional justice. 
If societal transformation as the aim of transitional justice were a common or received view, the absence of 
dedicated argument would be unremarkable. But it is not, putting the burden of argument on Murphy’s central 
claim. The actual inception of transitional justice thinking and practice saw accountability for past abuses as the 
‘justice’ in transitional justice (Arthur 2009; Bell 2009; Fletcher and Weinstein 2015). The driving question was 
whether impunity for gross abuses could be allowed to stand as the page of political transition turned. The 
answer that took shape in theory and practice was that societies emerging from eras of abuse were required, 
legally or morally, to attempt some justice with respect to the past even under fragile transitional conditions. 
The main outlines of the transitional justice menu of measures consolidated rapidly – trials, truth commissions, 
reparations, institutional reform – and has not dramatically altered in practice (Arthur 2009, 355; Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2015, 178, 192). Yet this field-defining conception has come under pressure with demands for more 
expansive and ambitious aims. 
The “transformative turn” in the literature is a wave of critique accompanied by aggressive demands and 
arguments for the extension and expansion of transitional justice goals to economic redistribution as well as 
structural transformation of social hierarchies (McAuliffe 2017, xiii). Critics contend that transitional justice is 
shaped by neo-liberal international agendas that sideline economic justice concerns (Mani 2002; Arbour 2007; 
Miller 2008; LaPlante 2008; Sharp 2015) and the role of oppression along lines of gender, ethnicity, indigeneity, 
and other systemic vectors in human rights abuses (Couillard 2007, Saris and Lofts 2009, Lambourne 2009, 
Gready & Robins 2014). The transformative wing of the literature sharply rebukes and rejects the predominant 
conception and practice of transitional justice (going well beyond the view that specific social, economic, and 
cultural rights violations need to be recognized as wrongs and dealt with by transitional measures (Schmid and 
Nolan 2014), and argues for its replacement or radical revision. 
I draw attention to this conspicuous feature of recent transitional justice discourse to highlight the fact that 
embedding the aim of societal transformation (economic and social-structural) in transitional justice is 
understood by others advocating for it as a transformation of transitional justice itself in theory and practice. To 
assert that societal transformation just is the overarching aim of transitional justice is to join a contest in which 
one has to fight one’s corner. I wonder why Murphy, who cites some of this “transformative transitional justice” 
literature, spends so little time developing or grounding this crucial point, and never places her own theory in 
contact or contrast with these approaches. 
Murphy’s approach does work that is largely missing from much of the transformative transitional justice 
literature. She provides a detailed account of the specifically relational transformation she envisions. There is, 
however, a shared deficit in transformative views: the absence of a theory of change that makes remotely 
plausible how the ideal aims of such approaches could be achieved, precisely in the transitional context in which 
they are advocated. The demandingness of claims about what transitional justice should do is in inverse relation 
to what transitional processes have been found to be able to do in fact. Legal scholar Padraig McAuliffe, in a 
relentless and powerful analysis in his book Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-
Conflict States, examines in detail the conditions familiar to peacebuilding and development studies make post-
conflict societies resistant even to modest social change, lessons some of which apply more widely in 
transitional contexts: these include weak state capacity, underdevelopment and/or patronage systems, elite 
control, and specific legacies of war and the peace agreements that terminate it (McAuliffe 2017, 64, 88). While 
Murphy’s methodology is to begin from the circumstances of transitional justice, her account comes short of a 
full picture of “those political and economic factors that make states or communities therein more or less 
malleable or amenable to change” (McAuliffe 2017, xi). The pursuit of accountability for past wrongs has itself 
proved daunting for these reasons, but the difficulties pale in comparison with the pursuit of societal 
transformation, which for Murphy includes changes in debilitating social norms and stereotypes as well as legal 
and political (and economic?) institutional reform (Murphy 132-133). 
What of the Role of Transitional Justice Measures? 
There are two respects in which Murphy’s analysis is vastly superior to most of what is found in the 
transformative transitional justice literature. First, the underlying conception of justice is theorized in detail. 
Second, Murphy’s chapter 4 on “The Just Pursuit of Transformation” is a beautifully argued and condensed 
investigation of what it means to respond in “an intrinsically fitting and appropriate manner to victims and 
perpetrators” (162). She is acutely aware that responding to wrongs is non-instrumentally important and not 
merely a dispensable means of promoting relational transformation (114). Murphy unfolds, rather than 
slighting, the moral logic of transitional measures as they apply to victims, perpetrators, or both, something 
seldom done at all by proponents of transformation. 
Murphy’s aim is to unpack the “just pursuit” part of her claim that transitional justice is “the just pursuit of 
societal transformation.” To be just, relational transformation of society must be pursued “via” responding 
appropriately to the wrongs done and suffered by particular individuals (112). She acknowledges that 
responding to past wrongs is “not typically linked with broader structural or relational change,” nor is the 
pursuit of societal reform typically linked with responding to past wrongs (112). But her distinctive view, 
reiterated throughout the book, is that societal transformation is to be pursued “by” or “through” or “via” the 
application of the kinds of measures in the transitional repertory, along with perhaps other transitional 
measures that redress wrongs (200). The requirement of redressing wrong, then, is not a side constraint on the 
independent pursuit of transformation but is rather the substance of transitional justice as an activity of dealing 
with the wrongs of the past in order to transform society. 
If it is reasonable to question societal transformation as the goal of transitional justice, it is even harder to 
comprehend how transitional justice is to seek societal transformation through mechanisms that redress the 
past. These devices make sense as accountability measures of diverse types (as Murphy makes wonderfully clear 
in her discussion of responses to wrongs), but they are highly improbable as ways to approach, much less 
accomplish, deep societal change; that is precisely the transformationalist indictment in the larger literature. 
Alongside their direct impact on acknowledging and redressing individuals and groups, they carry important 
expressive content and may create demonstration effects, but even in doing so they primarily aim to deal with 
the past in the present, and not by themselves to restructure the future. 
Murphy could give up the “in order to” link between these measures and societal transformation, and hold that 
transitional justice must aim at societal transformation in whatever ways are effective and just, so long as this 
includes, and is not at expense to, the process of responding to past wrongs (a “side constraint” view which 
would, it seems to me, better fit her analogy with just war theory). But this solution is unhappy both 
theoretically and practically. Practically, past-looking responses that address victims and perpetrators are sure to 
lose out to measures that promise wider social benefits; attention to victims and perpetrators is even more 
likely to be ignored than instrumentalized. Theoretically, the project of building a just society becomes just that 
– simply forward-looking reform aimed at a just society. Once the transitional scene becomes merely a supposed 
window of opportunity, then it’s just about justice, and not about transitional justice, anymore. 
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